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Abstract
This paper redirects some of the philosophical discussion of
sexual objecti cation. Rather than contributing further to
debates over what constitutes objecti cation and whether it is
harmful, I argue that aesthetic experience is a useful tool for
resisting objecti cation. Attending to our embodied experiences
provides immediate evidence that we are subjects; aesthetically
attending to that evidence is a way of valuing it. I consider the
human body as an aesthetic site, then as an ethico-aesthetic
site, and nally as a site of resistance. In addition to deepening
accounts of body aesthetic experience, this paper helps frame
human bodies as integral to moral agency, rather than
impediments to it.
Key Words
body aesthetics; felt experience; objecti cation; subjectivity
1. Introduction
In “Women Recovering Our Clothes,” Iris Marion Young
describes an experience of sexual objecti cation both captured
in and evoked by an advertisement for wool clothing.[1] The
two-panel advertisement’s slogan, “See yourself in wool,” invites
Young to imagine herself in place of the woman pictured the
rst panel, which she enthusiastically accepts. The resulting
imagined scenarios are lively and diverse, suggesting a full
human life. But the second panel shows the woman watched
from behind by a man, who Young describes as “bringing me
down to his size.” By including this second picture, the ad ips
the switch on women: they’re objects, after all. Young accepts
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the invitation to see herself as a subject on her own terms,
which the ad rejects. Both she, and the woman wearing wool,
are objects.
Young’s analysis of the ad and her response to it describes one
kind of sexual objecti cation; her analysis links ideas in feminist
lm criticism about subjects and objects, gazers and the gazedon. Young describes the pleasure of viewing fashion
advertisements as lying “in images of female bodies in their
clothes because my own gaze occupies the position of the male
gaze inasmuch as I am a subject at all.” This reading
oversimpli es her earlier response to the ad, where she
imagined herself as a subject in wool. It also reveals that
awareness of ourselves as subjects can run alongside our
experiences of objecti cation. In constructing a detailed
philosophical response to the ad, Young demonstrates a
subjectivity similar to traditional masculine subjectivity. But
another, more basic kind of subjectivity enables the
philosophical work and provides an immediate contradiction to
the objectifying narrative Young encounters. That basic
subjectivity, which is my focus here, lies partly in Young’s
disoriented response to the ad. For people in similar positions,
reminders of subjectivity can be found in disorientation and in
our bodily responses to objecti cation.
There is a lively existing literature on sexual objecti cation but
the terms of the philosophical discussion there are rather
narrow. Rather than contributing to the existing debates
primarily about what objecti cation is and whether it is harmful,
I focus on ways we can respond to our own sexual
objecti cation.[2] Rather than trying to understand
objecti cation itself, I am trying to understand how we can
respond to it without succumbing to it. How do we resist the
catcall? How do we refuse, rather than internalize, the way the
man in the ad, or the ad itself, sees us? And how do we resist the
idea that our bodies, so often the focus of objecti cation, do not
burden us? First, I argue that attention to embodied experiences
a rms subjectivity by providing (sometimes immediate!)
counter-testimony to objecti cation. A rmation and countertestimony enable resistance to objecti cation. However, we still
need to gure out how to give that counter-testimony special
weight, particularly since objecti cation often comes at us from
multiple sources and over a sustained period of time.[3]
My second suggestion is that aesthetic appreciation of
embodiment lends needed weight. I urge particular attention to
aesthetic facets of felt bodily experiences, thereby turning
aesthetic and moral attention to rst- personal experiences of
being a body (embodiment). Such a multisensory experience
emphasizes our bodies for ourselves, not for others. I focus on
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embodiment, especially bodily feelings, because bodies feature
so prominently in our thinking about and experiences of
objecti cation, embodiment and subjectivity intertwine, and
bodily feelings feature prominently and diversely in other forms
of subjective experience, such as emotions. It is important that
the attention be aesthetic because of the way aesthetic
experience intertwines with value and appreciation. Aesthetic
attention is a way of valuing something; it is also something we
do as subjects. Aesthetically valuing embodiment helps us resist
the kinds of oppression that deny our subjectivity and seek to
enlist us in that denial. Our bodies are not merely the occasion
of vulnerability and objecti cation but a source of resistance to
objecti cation and openness to resistance.
Mistrust of the physical facts of human existence has a long
history, while more recent work, particularly by feminist
philosophers, points out bodily and aesthetic burdens borne by
members of marginalized groups.[4] Even in this important
critical work, bodies remain “problems.” Rather than continuing
to place the sensuous in con ict with the moral, I highlight one
particular way the aesthetic and human bodies are allies of selfunderstanding and projects of resistance.[5] Human lives
present a complex union of subject-object experience. We are
objects, as physical beings regarded by others, and subjects, as
selves, persons, agents.[6] Bodily experiences, such as I discuss
here, are subjective, in the sense that they are personal, not
public, and not objective. Our subjective experience gives
evidence to our personhood when that personhood is under
threat from objecti cation. My focus is on humans who
experience objecti cation, often marginalized groups. I leave to
others the project of extending and nuancing the analysis to
dominant groups.
As Young’s essay demonstrates, bodily surfaces, signi cantly of
other people’s bodies, are readily available to our senses,
especially to sight. The ad Young engages o ers a clear case of
sighted aesthetic engagement with bodies. Surfaces are the
most intuitive point of entry for my project, and there is plenty
of work on bodily visibility.[7] The existing literature lays a
groundwork for the aesthetic’s presence in a non-traditional
arena, the rst-personal and felt. I rst consider the human
body as an aesthetic site, then as an ethico-aesthetic site, and
nally as a site of resistance. I next review work in aesthetics
emphasizing bodily experiences, particularly tactile experience
of one’s own body, as aesthetic experiences. I draw on work by
Sherri Irvin and Yuriko Saito to establish ways the body can be a
site of aesthetic experiences, rather than merely the conduit for
them. I then turn to feminist work on bodily experiences in the
context of moral value. Developing an awareness of bodily
changes and sensations, and their aesthetic characteristics,
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improves self-knowledge and self- understanding. As a speci c
instance of the impact of our aesthetic environment on our
moral lives, objecti cation illustrates the moral signi cance of
giving attention to the aesthetics of embodied experiences.
2. Body aesthetics outside and in
Aesthetic experience is, to borrow a term from Sherri Irvin,
pervasive. This section of the paper explores that pervasiveness
and outlines some aesthetic experiences speci c to
embodiment (body aesthetics). Body aesthetics expands
philosophy’s focus to include aesthetic experiences beyond artoriented aesthetics; here, I focus on felt experience. By directing
our aesthetic attention to bodies, the things people do to and
with bodies, and the experience of having a body, body
aesthetics understands aesthetic experience as, on some level,
always accessible.
Body aesthetics de-emphasizes the notion of aesthetic
experience as separate from our day-to-day lives, thereby
overlapping everyday aesthetics. Per Saito, everyday aesthetics
directs attention to “sensuous qualities like size, shape, color,
texture, sometimes smell, and the arrangements of parts. After
all, it is these sensuous qualities with which we interact on a
daily basis that, along with natural elements, make up the world
in which we live.”[8] Saito considers the sensuous qualities of
quotidian experiences such as laundry, landscaping, and
preparing and eating food. Such experiences include “aesthetic
tastes and attitudes [that] often … lead to consequences which
go beyond simply being preoccupied with the surface, and . . .
a ect not only our daily life but also the state of the society and
the world.”[9] Both Irvin and Saito’s views have received
pushback for their use of the term aesthetic that I will address in
Section IV. First, I survey the way body aesthetics analyzes
human bodies and the experience of embodiment.
Aesthetic values a ect the visible features of and practices
related to the body. Aesthetic judgments inform what we put on
and take o our bodies: clothing, makeup, hair, jewelry, tattoos,
fat, skin. Practices of body modi cation and care intersect with
self-understanding and self-expression. They express not only
“one’s evaluative feelings regarding oneself and what would
make one pretty, handsome, sexy . . .” but one’s cultural context
and relationship to that context.[10] Shirley Ann Tate, discussing
black women’s beauti cation practices and their experiences
navigating racialized beauty standards, writes that “[q]uestions
of bodily practices such as those of beauty are always discursive
and subject to the gaze of the other.”[11] However, the “gaze of
the other” is not de nitive of these practices, nor of the
practitioners. The meaning of black beauty practices originates
https://contempaesthetics.org/2020/02/18/first-personal-body-aesthetics-as-affirmations-of-subjectivity/
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in black people’s views of themselves. The gaze of the other
matters but so does the gaze of the self.[12]
Body aesthetics presents felt experiences as aesthetic
experiences by directing attention to aesthetic experiences of or
through the body. For example, Irvin draws on a Deweyan
account of “an experience” to help clarify why we should
aesthetically consider activities such as “run[ning] my tongue
back and forth on the insides of my closed teeth.”[13] In
addition to felt bodily sensations, the felt experiences from
interacting with the world are also richly aesthetic. Simple
features of the world, such as the smell of a cat’s fur, can be
quite complex: “[w]hen I lower my face into my cat’s fur, my
experience has subtle tactile, olfactory, visual, and emotional
components.”[14] We nd this complexity of meaning
elsewhere: scratching an itch, or the warm and coercive weight
of a cat sitting on the bed with you, or the beginnings of a
headache; such cases emphasize embeddedness and
responsiveness to the world.
As our emotional experiences gure prominently in embodied
aesthetic experiences, our emotional lives gure prominently in
our aesthetic experiences. They also share some structural
features. Emotional experiences frustrate conceptual divisions
between the feeling of our bodies and the appearances of them
and between our physical and our psychological selves. Many
emotional states leave visible signs: we smile, we unch our
shoulders, we cry. Such visual e ects are intuitively objects of
aesthetic evaluation. Facial expressions t into modes of
existing aesthetic evaluation, perhaps because faces are already
objects of aesthetic evaluation and labor. Here, I mean “object”
both in the sense of “focus” and in the sense of “thing.” Faces,
like the rest of the body, are both what we appraise and the
“raw material” transformed through aesthetic or interpersonal
activity. A smile changes facial appearance and is a visual display
and signal for others. Our visual habits of aesthetic appreciation
allow us to interpret a smile from the perspectives of observer
and creator.
However, I have much more access to the invisible records of
the smile: air on my teeth and tongue, the stretch of muscles in
my cheeks, jaw, lips, and throat. The emotional context of these
physical activities/sensations alters their aesthetic character.
The stretch of muscles in a forced smile has a di erent quality
from the stretch that accompanies a joyful one. We might not
even notice the tension in our muscles that results from a joyful
smile but nd a forced smile unbearable. Our relationships with
our bodies track both our understanding of what our bodies
look like when they do things as well as what it feels like to do or
undergo things.
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Because our tactile and visual senses are entangled, the division
between felt and visible experience is not especially neat. My
smile alters my eld of vision as well as feeling like something to
me. Further, it feels like something to see someone else smile,
too: sometimes like tension easing, sometimes like a lump in the
throat, and sometimes like wanting to slap someone. When we
nd our bodies undergoing these experiences, we learn
something about our bodily responses but we also learn about
our orientation to the world around us. As I argue in the rest of
the paper, attention to the aesthetic dimension of felt
experience underlines subjectivity and, at least potentially,
a rms personhood. For some of us, that a rmation might
constitute new knowledge but for others, it will at least be a
useful reminder, safeguarding subjectivity when it is at risk.
Certain groups are vulnerable to objecti cation and su er harm
because of this vulnerability and the way it positions them in
their communities. Women, generally, have to deal with sexual
objecti cation in ways that men, generally, do not.[15] People of
color and the economically vulnerable, a group that includes
many women, as well as queer and disabled people, and
children, also risk objecti cation and have limited means of
responding to it. Members of these groups experience both
sexual objecti cation and also a more general kind: diminished
access to the kind of moral consideration set down in the
second formulation of Kant’s categorical imperative.[16] They
are less likely to be treated as anything other than a means to
someone else’s end. In less Kantian terms, members of these
groups are more likely to nd other people reduce their
existence to the others’ own interests, rather than that
interactions with others re ect diverse particularity. In cases of
sexual objecti cation, those interests collect around often
oppressive sexual and gender dynamics.
In outlining the aesthetic possibilities of embodiment and the
way these possibilities often feature in our emotional lives, I
explained how it is that the body can be a source of aesthetic
experience beyond the obvious (visual) ways. Throughout this
section, I also kept my case study, objecti cation, in view,
focusing for the moment on its social and aesthetic aspects. But
the focus on objecti cation requires a more thorough
examination of the way the body, aesthetics included, features
in our moral lives. Objecti cation, after all, is primarily a moral
wrong, not an aesthetic one.
3. The ethico-aesthetic body
So: we have reasons to think of bodily experiences as aesthetic
experiences, to consider emotional experiences as intersecting
with aesthetic experiences, and to understand there are speci c,
under-explored aesthetic values permeating our embodiment.
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These aesthetic values may track our particular social context
and racial, ethnic, and gender identities and may relate,
sometimes quite closely, to moral values. I still need to clarify
how our bodies feature in our moral lives. It is easy to see how
they feature negatively: consider your behavior last time you got
hungry. But consider, too, handshakes and hugs. Drawing on
body aesthetics and feminist ethics, I argue that ethico-aesthetic
consideration of the body enables a richer appreciation of
embodiment and ethics. Framing our bodies as sources of
morally relevant information, rather than impediments to
rational moral actions, allows us to work with our bodies, rather
than against them.
An aesthetics of embodiment addresses the convergence of the
aesthetic and the moral. Irvin and Saito suggest at least two
sites of convergence. First, attending to everyday aesthetic
experiences can improve our appreciation of the world around
us and our moral agency. Appreciating aesthetic experiences
already available to us, including felt bodily experiences, may
make us less likely to search, irresponsibly and unre ectively,
for “new goods that make di erent experiences available.
Perhaps we can discover that we already have enough, or even
more than we need, to be satis ed.”[17] Second, awareness of
the ways our aesthetic values structure decision-making bolsters
our self-awareness and transparency. Saito explores the second
point in the context of environmental ethics. We have aesthetic
tastes for smooth green lawns and bright white cotton tee
shirts; acquiring and maintaining them involves a great deal of
money and hard work— but also, Saito points out, signi cant
environmental harm.[18] This is a good moral reason to adjust
our aesthetic thinking and, thereby, our moral activity. Irvin
suggests adjusting our sense of aesthetic value allows us to
reframe the moral project such that it no longer seems to hinge
on self-sacri ce.[19] For example, reducing meat consumption
can be “a matter of nding di erent ways to indulge the tastes
that were once satis ed by meat.” Some of these experiences,
such as the lawns, are largely external to bodies, while others,
such as food and clothing, more obviously interact with or are
incorporated into the body, although there is nothing in
principle stopping you from bodily engagement with a smooth
green lawn, and dogs certainly seem to enjoy rolling around on
them.
The relationship between bodily experiences and ethics also
emerges from the work of Gail Weiss and Ami Harbin, who
highlight the moral insights that can arise from attending to our
bodily experience. In Body Images, Weiss argues for an ethics
grounded in “bodily imperatives:” “ethical demands that bodies
place on other bodies in the course of our daily existence.”[20]
We must also attend to our own body’s demands. Harbin,
https://contempaesthetics.org/2020/02/18/first-personal-body-aesthetics-as-affirmations-of-subjectivity/
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in uenced by Weiss and Sara Ahmed, argues feeling
disoriented, particularly bodily disorientation, aids ethical
agency. Both Weiss’s and Harbin’s accounts are useful for
discussing objecti cation because they turn troubling or
negative experiences, such as illness, into increased insights and
moral agency. Weiss and Harbin describe encounters that upset
our habits of self-understanding but through which we gain
ethical insight. Objecti cation, as Young’s interaction with the
wool advertisement shows, is disorienting because one feels
oneself both object and subject. If properly attended to, our
bodily feelings reject the denigrating narrative of objecti cation.
In this case, the imperative arising from our own body is that we
recognize the emotional experiences, testimony of our
subjectivity, manifesting through it. While such an imperative is
unlikely to receive uptake from an objecti er, I argue that
cultivating habits of aesthetically appreciating the experiences
that form such an imperative makes us better able to meet the
imperative of our own body.
Weiss contrasts bodily imperatives with Kantian categorical
imperatives and other abstract or transcendent moral claims.
Bodily imperatives support a nely grained ethics,
encompassing the “physical and emotional responses that rise
out of our complex, concrete relationships with other
bodies.”[21] Bodily imperatives are moral commands that
“emerge out of our intercorporeal exchanges.”[22] For Weiss,
our self-concept, body included, relies in large part on our
relationships with other people. Weiss argues that relationships
are bodily/embodied, not the communion of abstract selves at
the mercy of their bodies or the bodies of others. Bodies are
integral to personal identity and relationships. The e ects of
one body on other bodies are reciprocal, which is not to deny
that they may be harmful and/or negative. Relationships and
moral communities have special signi cance for practices of
moral self-cultivation “that can only be experienced and enacted
through bodily practices . . .that both implicate and transform
the bodies of others.”[23] Weiss begins from bodies in their
diverse particularity, not bodies abstracted away from or
universalized into iconography. Bodily histories and speci c
characteristics, like age, are “a source of respect both for the
moral wisdom they can provide as well as for the that way they
contextualize” our relationships.[24]
Exchanges in the social, rather than biological, world often seem
to sideline bodily imperatives. Death and birth are instances
when the biological intervenes in the social with undeniable
force, and Weiss further contextualizes death and birth through
parent-child relationships. Weiss argues that the relationship
between maternal and fetal bodies is one case where bodily
imperatives are generally acknowledged and understood
https://contempaesthetics.org/2020/02/18/first-personal-body-aesthetics-as-affirmations-of-subjectivity/
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because “the intercorporeal exchanges between mother and
fetus are too striking to be ignored.”[25] In other contexts,
bodily interactions tend to be “described . . . in terms of
relatively discrete bodies interacting with other discrete
bodies.”[26] The bodily imperatives of a parent-child
relationship include feeding and cleaning the child, the child’s
need to be fed and cleaned, and the mother’s need to feed and
clean, though of course not all mothers experience these
imperatives. These bodily demands require embodied action.
We cannot eat in the abstract any more than we can wipe our
child’s or parent’s body clean of fecal matter in the abstract.
Weiss’s proposal aligns with other philosophies that view bodies
not as obstacles to morality but rather as media for moral
action. For example, classical Confucianism insists on
responsiveness to the particularities of human personalities and
relationships and communicates moral regard through bodily
behaviors. We see this in advice given about how to behave with
appropriate lial feeling and respect toward parents. Parents do
not simply require that their children meet their basic needs, as
“‘even dogs and horses are provided with nourishment. If you
are not respectful, wherein lies the di erence?'” Di erentiating
your dogs and horses from your parents is important work and
hinges, among other things, on the appropriate level of respect.
“Respectful” is conceived robustly, clari ed in the next passage,
when Confucius says, “‘It is the demeanor that is di cult.'”[27]
Anyone can “go through the motions” but moral regard must be
embodied. Bodily skill is expected for moral agency. That
classical Confucianism is a philosophy for rich young men,
people more likely to sexually objectify others than be
objecti ed themselves, clari es that bodily experience is morally
relevant to dominant groups in addition to marginalized ones.
[28] Confucian sources emphasize personal integrity, uniting
moral requirements, emotional states, and bodily practice.
Manners, comportment, and facial expressions are salient
because these are aspects of our embodiment that give other
people evidence of our emotional states. Primarily, they are
visual evidence; visible signs are the most accessible to others,
so it makes sense to focus on them thinking of interactions
among groups of people. It doesn’t help so much with
rst-personal experience. How can we return to a consideration
of felt experience, and what role might it play in our moral lives?
Ami Harbin’s work on bodily disorientation, in uenced by Weiss,
describes some of the possibilities for felt experience. Harbin
describes disorientation as “experiences of shock or surprise,
unease, and discomfort. They are often cued by feelings of
being out of place, unfamiliar, or not at home.”[29] Recalling
Saito and Irvin’s discussion of aesthetic experience, Harbin
frames moral life in terms of “day-to-day practices of interaction:
https://contempaesthetics.org/2020/02/18/first-personal-body-aesthetics-as-affirmations-of-subjectivity/
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with spaces, objects, living beings, events, projects, ideas, and
norms.” Harbin argues disorientation, “experienced through
complex corporeal, a ective, and cognitive processes,” is vital to
moral agency. Bodily disorientation changes our attentional
patterns, highlighting aspects of our experiences that otherwise
go unobserved:
disorientations often make more visible the ways my
well-being relies crucially on the work of others . . ., and this can
support
morally better, potentially reciprocal, interaction with them. As
disoriented,
we are more likely to stand out to others, to depend on them,
and to appreciate
their power in our lives; this can bring us into closer relationships
in some
cases and distance us from parts of our communities in others.

Like Weiss and Saito, Harbin links attention and ethics: “we
enact moral agency often through habits of attention and
action.” And it is important to keep the body in view, as
“processes of cognition and emotion cannot be theorized apart
from embodiment.”[30]
If we understand objecti cation as a kind of disorientation, and
Young’s account gives us reason for doing so, then Harbin’s
argument that disorientation helps us direct our attention and
critically evaluate our relationship with people and institutions
around us. It also furthers our self-knowledge; speci cally, it lets
us know we are subjects who can be viewed as objects. This is
not the same as learning we are objects! Alongside Confucian
philosophy, Harbin and Weiss shine a bright light on the
relationship between our bodies and the habitual and indicate
ways this relationship is relevant to our moral interactions.
Through their focus on bodies, they also suggest relevance for
the aesthetic. I turn now to aesthetic attention as a way of
valuing the habitual.
4. Aesthetic experience and subjectivity
The idea that paying attention is one way of acknowledging
value recurs in philosophy of the everyday. I argue that paying
attention to women’s experiences of objecti cation is one way
of counteracting everyday instances of gendered injustice. My
focus here is not on women’s testimonies about those
experiences but on the phenomenology of objecti cation and
the way attention to bodily feelings a rms subjectivity. Further,
the aesthetic has a special place in the ongoing, many-layered
project of counteracting gendered injustices and understanding
one’s own condition. So, the attention I advocate is, at least in
part, aesthetic attention. I will start by explaining why this is a
project for aesthetics, not just ethics or political philosophy.
https://contempaesthetics.org/2020/02/18/first-personal-body-aesthetics-as-affirmations-of-subjectivity/
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There are three reasons for thinking we should understand my
project as aesthetic, rather than merely moral. First, aesthetic
values play a large role in processes of objecti cation, such that
aesthetic norms signal the value of certain kinds of bodies.
Second, deviation from or adherence to these norms makes one
particularly vulnerable to objecti cation. In the spectrums of
feminine self-presentation, the middle ground allows one to
pass unremarked but “ostentatiously” feminine or notably
androgynous or masculine self-presentation “provoke”
comments. Certain bodies get classed as “extremely feminine”
or “androgynous” without much agential action at all: people
have relatively little to say about the size of their breasts or the
width of their hips. Finally, the link between aesthetic attention
and moral agency means there is a particular need to counter
aesthetic oppression with aesthetic liberation. I use the ethicoaesthetic norm of sexiness to illustrate these points.
Aesthetic values inform our judgments about our own bodies
and the bodies of others, sometimes enabling objecti cation.
We consider bodies in light of norms like sexiness and altered
bodies/bodily appearances, with respect to such norms. Though
actual ideas about what “counts” as sexy are as diverse as the
people who hold them, what A. W. Eaton calls our “collective
taste” for/in sexiness is fairly limited.[31] It readily acknowledges
white, able bodies. It makes room, sometimes, for racially and
ethnically “ambiguous” bodies, provided they meet or better the
standards of white sexual desirability. In the 1990s, bell hooks
argued that Naomi Campbell “embodies an aesthetic that
suggests black women, while appealingly ‘di erent,’ must
resemble white women to be considered really beautiful,” while
also being photographed in highly sexualized contexts.[32]
Whatever racial progress has occurred since the 1990s, the
sense that Lupita Nyong’o’s Vogue covers push the boundaries
of mainstream beauty persists. Vogue covers, in general, track a
slightly di erent kind of desirability than concepts of sexiness
do, and Nyong’o and Campbell are not treated as desirable,
beautiful, or sexy in the same way Kate Upton is. (They are high
fashion in a way Upton is not).[33] However, the ideals intersect
and overlap, such that women navigate their relationship to
each. For women of color, sexual desirability and beauty are
fraught and often dehumanizing, objectifying in a surprisingly
narrow sense. For example, Robin Zheng, writing about “yellow
fever,” or white men’s sexual “preference” for Asian and Asiandescended women, argues that “racial depersonalization
inherent in yellow fever threatens Asian/American women with
doubts as to whether they are or can be loved as individuals
rather than as objects in a category.”[34] Asian/American
women who nd themselves outside the lines of “collective
taste” for Asian/American female bodies might nd themselves
https://contempaesthetics.org/2020/02/18/first-personal-body-aesthetics-as-affirmations-of-subjectivity/
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with doubts as to whether they can be loved as objects in a
category, let alone individuals. Desirability seems possible only
through the lens of the exotic and the subhuman.
Sexiness is oddly positioned in the context of gender. It
sometimes permits male bodies to be desirable as bodies,
rather than as people.[35] However, the cultural content of
sexiness still requires pouting lips, lush cleavage, and a dramatic
hip-waist ratio, and none of these attributes traditionally fall
within the domain of the male body.[36] Most female bodies
also fail to realize these attributes, and so women-in-waiting
“must” learn to counterfeit them through purchases (lip gloss,
elaborate lingerie) or postures (shoulders back, one foot
forward, back arched). The norm here is visual: the goal is to
create an appearance of sexiness, contemplated at a distance.
This appearance of sexiness happens to be pretty useless for
reciprocal sexual activity; it’s very di cult to remain sexy while
taking o your Spanx. Failure to learn how to mimic the norm of
sexiness can have terrible consequences.[37] So, too, can
success.
The mode of judgment, conformity to, and rejection of such
ideals as sexiness is paradigmatically visual. This is particularly
true of other-directed aesthetic activity but also of much selfdirected aesthetic activity. Applying red lipstick, for example,
does seem like an act of distancing me from my body; it sets up
the kind of object/observer dynamic that got us into this
problem in the rst place. However, felt experience is less easily
categorized according to objectifying norms. Indeed, I suggest
that felt experience o ers a strong counter to objecti cation.
Paying attention to felt experience foregrounds subjectivity by
making salient those parts of our being which are speci c to us
individually: our emotions, reactions, histories, and the
nebulous, sometimes mysterious internal sensations that only
we have (total) access to. Only I know what the drag of the
lipstick feels like. Only I know if it dries my lips. This is as
important to my experience of the lipstick as whether the
lipstick looks “perfect.” In public, only other people can see if it
does, and other people are not very good at noticing. While my
choosing to wear lipstick is one clear expression of subjectivity,
my own, private and speci c knowledge of “what it is like to
wear this lipstick” continues to con rm that what I am is not
de ned by social scripts around me.[38]
We do not need to wear lipstick to create or provide an aesthetic
experience for observers. The earlier example of smiling raised
the multi-dimensional aspect of unadorned embodiment. Our
bodies already have visual and tactile features; they look like
something, they feel like something, even at rest. Further, we
can move our bodies in ways (smiling, or frowning, and
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countless other movements) that produce additional aesthetic
e ects for observers. For us, these experiences are felt. An
aesthetic appreciation of such feelings might entail, as Irvin
suggests about itches and scratches, “acknowledging . . . how
they call attention to our somatic experience and how they color
that experience in certain ways.”[39] The way we experience our
own embodiment matters, just as the way we experience other
people’s embodiment matters. Some of that experience is, or
can be, aesthetic.
Recognizing the aesthetic aspect of embodiment is, on some
level, just a response to the bare facts of human existence. At
the most basic level, aesthetic appreciation of embodiment just
acknowledges that there are sensuous experiences speci c to
my embodiment I can attend to in ways that inform me about
the world and myself. But making the aesthetic aspects of our
experience salient alters our way of valuing them. Calling
attention to something’s sensuous qualities and fully attending
to the speci cs of sensuous experience, rather than screening
them out, is a way of giving that experience value and weight.
Aesthetic experience pervades our lives – but value pervades
aesthetic experience.
With this in mind, let me suggest a further arena where
aesthetic attention to felt embodied experiences is morally
valuable: when objecti ed by another. Objecti cation seeks to
cut women down to size, reminding them they are rst and
foremost things for men to consider possessing. Receiving this
kind of evaluation can be humiliating. That humiliation has its
own bodily phenomenologies. In the face of an objectifying hiss,
my nausea, hot cheeks, and curled lip “color my somatic
experience,” as Irvin describes it, and rea rm my personhood—
if I let them. These bodily reactions push back against the gaze
of ownership, a rming my sense that a moral wrong has been
done to me. In communicating contempt through a curled lip
and registering my anger by the heat in my cheeks, I redirect the
negative emotional/moral reaction of shame away from my self
and toward the person who has actually committed the
violation. Simply noting my bodily responses is insu cient to
make this shift;I must also appreciate the bodily responses.
Without a way of valuing these responses, I do not have a
reliable way to heed the evidence they o er. Lacking that cue to
pay attention to the bodily testimony, I distance and alienate
myself from the body that received this moral wrong. People
who routinely navigate objecti cation risk habituated alienation
of their bodies, negatively a ecting moral functioning and wellbeing.
I hope that, in this way, I can respond to those who criticize Irvin
and Saito for trivializing the term “aesthetic.” My account hits a
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number of ideas that critics, particularly Christopher Dowling
and Brian Soucek, worry about. Dowling worries accounts like
Irvin’s “equivocat[e] between ‘aesthetic value’ and ‘pleasure;'”
many everyday experiences are pleasurable without being
aesthetic.[40] I’m not advocating pleasure in the bodily feelings
that arise when we feel ourselves objecti ed, only appreciation.
Dowling might very well worry that my account o ers neither
aesthetic value nor pleasure. Per Soucek, in the absence of “an
object that is as least in principle publicly accessible, one simply
lacks an aesthetic experience.”[41] Felt bodily experiences are
not in principle publicly accessible (that I know of).
I’m going to borrow Irvin’s response to these critiques. She
pushes against the privacy assumption: as “physiologically
similar creatures, common stimuli produce similar sensations in
us” and these sensations are, by virtue of our membership in a
society, capable of being described, evaluated, and subjected to
norms, including aesthetic ones.[42] Applying aesthetic norms
to bodily experience, Irvin argues, does not di er wildly from
applying them to artworks or nature. In both cases, one
“observe[s] various non-aesthetic aspects” or facts about the
world, and applies “norms available in the public domain” to
those facts. Irvin’s defense of itches seems applicable to the
ushed cheeks that accompany shame or anger or to the
disorientation Harbin and Young describe. I think I can borrow
Irvin’s reasoning to respond to Dowling, too. I don’t feel pleasure
when my cheeks ush but I may recognize the symmetry of
anger and shame in response to a wrong. This anger alters my
body in ways visible and invisible, and the invisible alterations
have as many qualitative features, including emotional content,
as the visible ones. Additionally, reasons I have o ered for
thinking the aesthetic aids us in resisting objecti cation push
back against the worry that we lose something by expanding the
scope of the “aesthetic.” By developing new appreciative habits
that a rm our subjectivity, we strengthen the aesthetic’s
relationship to justice.
Aesthetic attention is not the only attention that can achieve this
e ect but earlier arguments, about acknowledging and seeking
out aesthetic experience in daily life, help explain why the
aesthetic can make this kind of resistance more e ective.
Attending to the aesthetics of something and recognizing
aesthetic experience as a possible response to our interaction
with a thing is a way of valuing that thing. A key component of
those earlier arguments was that seeking out and appreciating
aesthetic experience in unexpected areas helps change our
orientation toward those areas. So, as the earlier example went,
appreciating the aesthetic experiences unique to vegetables can
help us appreciate vegetables more, thereby facilitating a
vegetable-centric diet. I am not suggesting we aesthetically
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appreciate being objecti ed but rather that we cultivate an
aesthetic appreciation of our bodily responses to objecti cation.
Our bodies are the vegetables; aesthetically appreciating bodily
responses, particularly felt responses accessible only to us, is a
way of valuing the body and our a ective reactions to the world
around us. In situations of oppression, valuing our bodily
counter-testimony helps us resist the forces structuring that
oppression. Attending to the aesthetic facets of the testimony
helps cultivate an attitude of value toward that testimony.
Aesthetically attending to the body makes both object and
subject experience salient, thereby preventing us from
perpetuating the idea, on which some kinds of oppression rely,
that subjects and objects are mutually exclusive.
Through such attention, I learn to appreciate my body as
something that strengthens my subjectivity. Bodily experiences,
in the totality of their feeling, are only accessible subjectively.
They are not other-regarding but private. In their privacy and
subjectivity, felt experiences render objectifying comments and
gazes incomplete. Felt experiences o er immediate countertestimony to the objectifying judgment and suggest other
sources of self-understanding and value. In conditions of
oppression, it is important to have ideas about what alternatives
we have or make in opposition to oppressive structures.
Subjective experiences that say, “but I am a person and it does
matter how I am treated,” o er one such alternative. Aesthetic
appreciation of that subjective experience, because of its close
relationship with value and worth, gives persuasive power to the
counter- testimony of our embodiment.
Finally, attention to felt experience helps render bodies fully
human rather than merely a precondition for objecti cation or
impediment to moral action. It accomplishes this by adjusting
our understanding of what having a body means. We remain
vulnerable; but focusing on the aesthetic possibilities resulting
from our embodiment that makes sensuous experience
possible suggests new ways of approaching the experience. The
body is central to our humanity, in that it features prominently
and, at least sometimes, positively in our moral lives. The body
is a rich source of meaningful experience, singularly available to
embodied beings. Pointing out the conditions of human
existence and suggesting new ways to relate to those conditions
certainly is a philosopher’s task.
5. Conclusion
By decentering the outward appearance of bodies and instead
attending to the speci cities of felt experience, we can
foreground subjectivity and reframe the aesthetic in three ways.
First, it makes the aesthetic an aid to our moral lives. Second, it
unites aesthetics and ethics by using the aesthetic to redirect
https://contempaesthetics.org/2020/02/18/first-personal-body-aesthetics-as-affirmations-of-subjectivity/

15/21

10/5/2020

https://contempaesthetics.org/2020/02/18/first-personal-body-aesthetics-as-affirmations-of-subjectivity/

attention to our own embodiment and, thereby, our own
subjectivity. Aesthetic experience is put to ethical purpose.
Third, it presents a positive link between aesthetic experiences
and bodily experiences, rather than simply placing the body at
the mercy of (often-corrupt) aesthetic values.
My argument further o ers reasons to move beyond versions of
our moral lives and our aesthetic experiences that, when they
acknowledge embodiment’s role at all, denigrate the body’s role
in moral or aesthetic processes. Instead, it suggests ways bodies
positively contribute to our ethico-aesthetic lives and are worthy
objects of moral and aesthetic attention. One key contribution is
the embodied aesthetic experience’s ability to facilitate
resistance to oppression, by reminding us, when we experience
certain kinds of oppression, of the counter-evidence we can
marshal against oppressive narratives and structures. This
resistance, as I understand it, is limited; it mostly has to do with
constructing a self-understanding that allows us to reject the
version of ourselves oppressive narratives and acts, like sexual
objecti cation, propagate. Though it is clearly no replacement
for political action and other forms of outward resistance, it may
make outward resistance feasible.
Let me close by suggesting another issue I have not discussed
here, partly for reasons of space and focus. What does a better
understanding of our ability, as individuals, to resist
objecti cation suggest for our moral prospects in community
with others?[43] How can we use disorientation to understand
not just ourselves but others, too? And how can we take up this
question without expecting people vulnerable to objecti cation
to bend over backwards to accommodate the perspectives of
their objecti ers? It seems to me that these questions are the
next step in a more diverse philosophical discussion of
objecti cation and human bodies.
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